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Abstract—We consider a communication scenario, in which
an intruder, employing a deep neural network (DNN), tries
to determine the modulation scheme of the intercepted signal.
Our aim is to minimize the accuracy of the intruder, while
guaranteeing that the intended receiver can still recover the un-
derlying message with the highest reliability. This is achieved by
constellation perturbation at the encoder, similarly to adversarial
attacks against DNN-based classifiers. In the latter perturbation
is limited to be imperceptible to a human observer, while in
our case perturbation is constrained so that the message can
still be reliably decoded by the legitimate receiver which is
oblivious to the perturbation. Simulation results demonstrate
the viability of our approach to make wireless communication
secure against DNN-based intruders with minimal sacrifice in the
communication performance.
Index Terms—secure communication, deep learning, adversar-
ial attacks, modulation classification
I. INTRODUCTION
As wireless is becoming the dominant means of communi-
cations, securing wireless communication links is as essential
as increasing their efficiency and reliability, for military,
commercial as well as consumer communication systems. The
standard approach to securing communications is to encrypt
the data; however, encryption may not always provide full
security (e.g., side-channel attacks), or strong encryption may
not be available due to complexity limitations (e.g., IoT
devices). To further improve the security, encryption can be
complemented with other techniques, preventing the adversary
from even recovering the encrypted bits.
As outlined in [1], an adversary implements its attacks
in four steps: 1) tunes into the frequency of the transmitted
signal; 2) detects whether there is signal or not; 3) intercepts
the signal by extracting its features; and 4) demodulates the
signal by exploiting the extracted features, and obtains a binary
stream of data. Preventing any of these steps can strengthen
the security of the communication link. While encryption
focuses on protecting the demodulated bit stream, physical
layer security [2] targets the forth step by minimizing the
mutual information available to the intruder. Recently, there
has also been significant interest in preventing the second
step through covert communications [3]. In this work, we
instead focus on the third step, and aim at preventing the
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adversary from detecting the modulation scheme used for
communications.
Modulation detection is the step between signal detec-
tion and demodulation in communication systems, and thus
plays an important role in data transmission, as well as
in detection and jamming of unwanted signals in military
communications and other sensitive applications [4]. Recently,
deep learning techniques have led to significant progress
in modulation detection accuracy, where convolution neural
networks (CNNs) and other deep neural networks (DNNs) are
employed to estimate the modulation scheme directly from
the received modulated symbols, without any explicit feature
representation, and surpass the accuracy of complex traditional
modulation detectors based on likelihood function or feature-
based representation [5]–[7].
Our aim in this paper is to prevent an intruder that employs a
CNN-based modulation detector from successfully identifying
the modulation scheme being used. We argue that, if the
intruder is unable to identify the modulation scheme, it is
unlikely to be able to decode the underlying information, or
employ modulation-dependent jamming techniques to prevent
communication. Note that the main challenge here is to
guarantee that the intended receiver of the transmitted signal
can continue to receive the underlying message at a reasonable
probability of error. Otherwise, reducing the accuracy of the
modulation-detecting intruder would be trivial by sacrificing
the performance of the intended receiver. Here, we assume
that the intended receiver is oblivious to the modifications
employed by the transmitter to confuse the intruder and;
therefore, the goal of the transmitter is to introduce as small
modifications to the transmitted signal as possible, which are
sufficient to fool the intruder but not larger than the error
correction capabilities of the intended receiver.
We note here that introducing small variations into the
modulation scheme that can fool a DNN-based detector is
similar to adversarial attacks on DNNs [8], [9]. However,
while the goal in these attacks is to expose the vulnerability
of DNNs against very small changes in the input that lead
to incorrect decisions, we exploit the same approach here to
defend a communication link against an intruder that employs
DNNs for interception.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider wireless communication in the presence of
a modulation detector. The transmitter maps a binary input
sequence w ∈ {0, 1}m into a sequence of n complex channel
input symbols, x ∈ Cn, employing forward error correction
coding. The input data is first encoded by the channel encoder
and then modulated for transmission. Formally, the modulated
signal x is obtained as x = Ms(w) where s ∈ S is the em-
ployed modulation scheme with S denoting the set of available
modulation schemes, and for any s, Ms : {0, 1}m → Cn
denotes the whole encoder function with modulation s. We
assume that Ms satisfies the power constraint (1/n)‖x‖22 ≤ 1
for any data w. After encoding, the signal x is sent over a
noisy channel, assumed to be an additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) channel for simplicity: the baseband signals y1 and
y2, received by the receiver and the intruder, respectively, are
given by
yi = Ms(w) + zi = x+ zi, i = 1, 2, (1)
where z1, z2 ∈ Cn are independent realizations of the channel
noise (also independent of x) with independent zero-mean
complex Gaussian components with variance σ21 and σ
2
2 ,
respectively. The receiver, upon receiving the sequence of
noisy channel symbols y1, demodulates the received signal,
and decodes the underlying message bits with the goal of
minimizing the (expected) bit error rate
e(w,y1) =
∑m
i=1 I{wi 6= wˆi}, (2)
where wˆ is the decoded bit sequence from y1.
1
The intruder aims to determine the modulation scheme used
by the transmitter, based on its received noisy channel output
y2 (note that we consider the case where the estimation of
the modulation scheme has to be done based on n channel
symbols). The transmitter, on the other hand, wants to commu-
nicate without its modulation scheme being correctly detected
by the intruder, while keeping the BER in an acceptable range.
Formally, the aim of the intruder is to determine, for any
sequence of channel output symbols y2 ∈ Cn, the modulation
method used by the transmitter. This leads to a classification
problem where the label s ∈ S is the employed modulation
scheme and the input to the classifier is the received channel
sequence y2 ∈ Cn. We consider the case when the intruder
implements a score-based classifier and assigns to y2 the label
sˆ = argmaxs′∈S fθ(y2, s
′), where fθ : C
n × S → R is a
score function parametrized by θ ∈ Rd, which assigns a score
(pseudo-likelihood) to each possible class s′ ∈ S for every
y2, and finally selects the class with the largest score. With
a slight abuse of notation, we denote the resulting class label
by sˆ = fθ(y2). The goal of the intruder is to maximize the
probability Pr(s = sˆ) of correctly detecting the modulation
scheme, which we will also refer to as the success probability
of the intruder.2 For the state-of-the-art modulation detection
1For any event E, I{E} = 1 if E holds, and 0 otherwise. Furthermore,
for any real or complex vector v, vi denotes its ith coordinate.
2Here we assume an underlying probabilistic model about how the bit
sequence w and the modulation scheme are selected.
scheme of [6], fθ is a CNN classifier, with θ being the weights
of the neural network, while f(y2, s
′) are the so-called logit
values for the class labels s′ ∈ S.
III. MODULATION PERTURBATION TO AVOID DETECTION
Our goal in this paper is to modify the encoding processes
Ms such that, given a modulation scheme s ∈ S, the new en-
coding methodM ′s ensures that the intruder’s success probabil-
ity gets smaller, while the BER of the receiver (using the same
decoding procedure for Ms) does not increase substantially.
Our solution is motivated by adversarial attacks for image
classification, where it is possible to modify images such
that the modification is imperceptible to a human observer,
but it makes state-of-the-art image classifiers to err [8], [9].
Adversarial examples are particularly successful in fooling
high-dimensional DNN classifiers. Applying the same idea to
our problem, we aim to find modified modulation schemesM ′s
such that M ′s(w) ≈Ms(w), but the intruder misclassifies the
new received signal y′2 = M
′
s(w)+z2 with higher probability.
A. Adversarial attacks in an idealized scenario
Following the idea of adversarial attacks on image classifiers
[9], an idealized adversarial attack to the classifier fθ of the
intruder would modify a correctly classified channel output
sequence y2 (i.e., for which s = fθ(y2)) with a perturbation
δ ∈ Cn such that fθ(y2 + δ) 6= fθ(y2), the true label. At
the same time, we require that the same modification to the
input of the decoder does not hurt the performance, that is,
the sequence y1 + δ is decoded at a similar accuracy as y1.
To facilitate this, we impose the restriction ‖δ‖2 ≤ ǫ for
some small positive constant ǫ. Thus, to mask the modulation
scheme and keep the BER reasonable, we aim to find, for
each correctly classified y2 separately, a perturbation δ that
maximizes the zero-one loss:
maximize I{fθ(y2 + δ) 6= s} such that ‖δ‖2 ≤ ǫ , (3)
where s = fθ(y2) is the true modulation label.
If the maximum is 1, such a δ results in a successful
adversarial perturbation and a successful adversarial example
y2 + δ (i.e., one for which the intruder makes a mistake),
while the BER is likely still small. Thus, in practice we could
achieve our goal if we could modify the encoder such that the
channel output at the intruder is y2 + δ and at the receiver
it is y1 + δ. Unfortunately, in practice we can only control
the channel input x at the transmitter, and the channel outputs
y1 and y2 depend not only on x, but also on the channel
noise. Therefore, we refer to the above mechanism, which was
analyzed in [10] without noticing that it is an idealized and
impractical scenario, as the oracle scheme, and use it only as
a baseline.
It remains to give an algorithm that finds an adversarial
perturbation δ solving the search problem (3). However, we
note that the target function I{fθ(y2+δ) 6= fθ(y2)} is binary,
hence flat, and so no gradient-based search is directly possible.
To alleviate this, usually a surrogate loss function L(θ,y2, s)
to the zero-one loss is used (which is also used in training
the classifier fθ , i.e., finding the parameter vector θ with the
best classification performance over a training data set), which
is amenable to gradient-based optimization. For classification
problems, a standard choice is the cross-entropy loss defined
as L(θ,y2, s) = − log(1+e−fθ(y2,s)), and one can search for
adversarial perturbations by solving
maximize L(θ,y2 + δ, s) such that ‖δ‖2 ≤ ǫ. (4)
Different methods are used in the literature to solve (4)
approximately [9], [11]. In this paper we use the state-of-the-
art projected (normalized) gradient descent (PGD) attack [12]
to generate adversarial examples, which is an iterative method:
starting from y0 = y2, in iteration t it calculates
y
t = ΠBǫ(y2)
(
y
t−1 + β
∇yL(θ,yt−1, s)
‖∇yL(θ,yt−1, s)‖2
)
, (5)
where β > 0 denotes the step size, and ΠBǫ(y2) denotes the
Euclidean projection operator to the L2-ball Bǫ(y2) of radius ǫ
centered at y2, while∇ denotes taking the gradient. The attack
is typically run for a given number of steps, which depends on
the computational resources; in practice yt is more likely to
be a successful adversarial example for larger values of t. We
will refer to this idealized modulation scheme as the Oracle
Defensive Modulation Scheme (ODMS).
Note that this formulation assumes that we have access
to the logit function fθ of the intruder; these methods are
called white-box attacks. If fθ is not known, one can create
adversarial examples against another classifier fθ′ , and hope
that it will also work against the targeted model fθ. Such
methods are called black-box attacks, and are surprisingly
successful against image classifiers [13].
B. Practical methods
As mentioned before, the perturbation method described in
the previous section is infeasible in practice, as the channel
noise at the intruder is not known. Thus, any practical scheme
has to modify the channel input x = Ms(w). Thus, the new
modulation scheme is defined as
M ′s(w) = α(Ms(w) + δ)
where we will consider different choices for δ ∈ Cn, and
the multiplier α =
√
n/‖Ms(w) + δ‖2 is used to ensure
that the new channel input x¯ = M ′s(w) satisfies the average
power constraint (1/n)‖x¯‖22 ≤ 1. The signals received at the
receiver and at the intruder are y¯1 = x¯+z1 and y¯2 = x¯+z2,
respectively. The difficulty in this scenario is that the effect of
any carefully designed perturbation δ may (and, in fact, will)
be at least partially masked by the channel noise. Furthermore,
since now the perturbed signal is transmitted at the actual SNR
of the channel, the effective SNR of the system is decreased,
as the transmitted signal already includes the perturbation δ,
which can be treated as noise from the point of view of
transmitting x (and not x¯).
Our first and simplest method to find a perturbation δ
disregards the effects of the channel noise and the resulting
BER at the receiver:
1) Defensive Modulation Scheme without BER control
(DMS): In this method we aim to solve the optimization
problem (4) with x in place of y2, via (5) initialized at y
0 = x
and with projection to Bǫ(x) (for a given number of iterations
t and perturbation size ǫ).
Next, we consider methods that can also optimize for the
BER e(y¯1,w) at the receiver (see Eqn. 2): that is, instead of
enforcing the perturbation δ to be small and hoping for only
a slight increase in the BER, we optimize also for the latter.
There is an inherent trade-off between our two targets: a larger
δ results in a bigger reduction in the detection accuracy of the
intruder, but will also increase the BER at the receiver, while a
smaller δ results in a smaller BER but provides less protection
against the intruder. We consider two methods to handle this
trade-off:
2) BER-Aware Defensive Modulation Scheme (BDMS): To
balance the above two effects, we consider a (signed) linear
combination of our two target functions
Lλ(θ, x¯, s, z1, z2) = L(θ, x¯+ z2, δ)− λe(x¯+ z1,w)
for some λ > 0 where y¯i = x¯+zi, i = 1, 2, and aim to find a
perturbation δ or, equivalently, a modulated signal x¯ = x+ δ
that maximizes the expectation
Ez1,z2 [Lλ(θ,x, s, z1, z2)] (6)
with respect to the channel noise z1, z2. Here we can use
stochastic gradient descent (ascent) to compute an approximate
local optimum, but in practice we find that enforcing δ to be
small during the iteration improves the performance; hence, we
use a stochastic version of the PGD optimization (5): starting
at x0 = x, our candidate for x¯ is iteratively updated as
x
t = ΠBǫ(x)
(
x
t−1 + β
∇xL(θ,xt−1, s, zt1, zt2)
‖∇xL(θ,xt−1, s, zt1, zt2)‖2
)
,
where zti are independent copies of zi, respectively, for
i = 1, 2, and t = 1, 2, . . .. Although Ez1 [e(x¯ + z1,w)] is
differentiable, e(y,w) for a given fixed value of y is not (since
it takes values from the finite set {0, 1/n, . . . , 1}). Similarly to
[14], we approximate the gradient of the expected error using
SPSA [15] as
∇¯y e(y,w)= 1
K
K∑
k=1
e(y+ηrk,w)− e(y−ηrk,w)
2η
r
⊤
k , (7)
where r1, . . . , rK are random vectors selected independently
and uniformly from {−1, 1}n.
3) BER-Aware Orthogonal Defensive Modulation Scheme
(BODMS): An alternative method is that instead of maximiz-
ing the combined target (6), we try to maximize the cross-
entropy loss L(θ, y¯2, s) while not increasing (substantially)
the BER e(y¯1,w). In order to do so, we maximize L(θ, y¯2, s)
using stochastic PGD (again, in every step we choose inde-
pendent noise realizations), but we restrict the steps in the
directions where the bit error rate does not change. Thus, in
every step we update xt−1 in a direction orthogonal to the
gradient of the BER defined as
∇oL(θ,xt−1 + zt2, s)
, ∇xL(θ,xt−1 + zt2, s)−
〈∇xL(θ,xt−1 + zt2, s), de〉de
where de = ∇¯xe(xt−1 + zt1,w)/‖∇¯xe(xt−1 + zt1,w)‖2 is the
(approximate) gradient direction of the BER.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we test the performance of our methods
in simulations. We assume that the binary source data is
generated independently, uniformly at random, and is en-
code using a rate 2/3 convolutional code before modulation.
Eight standard baseband modulation schemes are consid-
ered: ‘GFSK’, ‘CPFSK’, ‘PSK8’, ‘BPSK’, ‘QPSK’, ‘PAM4’,
‘QAM16’, ‘QAM64’, and the modulated data is sent over
an AWGN channel with signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) varying
between -20dB and 20dB. After demodulation, the receiver
uses Viterbi decoding to estimate the original source data.
The intruder is assumed to use a DNN to detect the
modulation scheme. We follow the setup of [6]: The intruder
has to estimate the modulation scheme after receiving 128
complex I/Q (in-phase /quadrature) channel symbols; this is
because we assume that the modulation detection is only the
first step for the intruder, which then uses this information
for either trying to decode the message or to interfere with
its transmission. Therefore, the modulation detection should
be completed based on a short sequence of channel symbols.
As the classifier, we apply the same deep CNN architecture
as [6] for the intruder, which operates on the aforementioned
256-dimensional data.
For each modulation scheme, we generate data resulting
in approximately 245000 I/Q channel symbols (note that for
different modulation schemes this corresponds to different
number of data bits), split into blocks of 128 I/Q symbols
(n = 128), as explained above. The last 300 blocks for each
modulation scheme are reserved for testing the performance
(tests are repeated 20 times), while we train a separate classi-
fier for each SNR value, based on the above data. As shown
in Fig. 1 (see the graph with label ’NoPerturb’), for high SNR
values the accuracy of the modulation classification is close to
90%. As expected, the classification accuracy degrades as the
SNR decreases (as the noise masks the signal), but even at
−10dB, the intruder can achieve a 40% detection accuracy.
Note that this performance is achieved when the standard
modulation schemes are employed.
In the experiments we compare this performance to
• our three defensive modulation schemes, DMS, BDMS,
and BODMS;
• the oracle defensive modulation scheme ODMS;
• adding uniform random noise of L2-norm ǫ to a block,
called DMS-uniform (DMSU );
• a black-box mechanism that does not use the classifier of
the intruder, but calculates DMS against a classifier that
has the same architecture as that of the intruder’s but is
trained separately (assuming no channel noise); we call
this substitute DMS (DMSS).
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Fig. 1: Modulation classification accuracy of the intruder as a
function of SNR for different defensive modulation schemes.
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(a) PSK8
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(b) QAM64
Fig. 2: Bit Error Rate of PSK8 and QAM64 modulated signal
for different defensive modulation schemes.
All the above schemes, except for DMSU , are implemented
using the projected (normalized) gradient descent (PGD) [12]
method from the CleverHans Library [16], with 20 iterations,
β = 0.2 and ǫ = 3. DMSU uses the same ǫ. Note that
a perturbation of this size accounts for about 7% of the
total energy of a block (which is 128 due to our normal-
ization to the energy constraint). ODMS serves as a baseline
showing the best achievable defensive performance given the
parameters, while the role of DMSU is to analyze the effect
of carefully crafted perturbations instead of selecting them
randomly. DMSS explores the more practical situation where
less knowledge is available about the intruder.
Fig. 1 shows the modulation classification accuracy for
several methods. It can be seen that adding random noise
(DMSU ) helps very little compared to no defense (NoPerturb)
at all. The basic defense mechanism DMS and its black-
box version (DMSS) become effective from about −5 dB
SNR, and–as expected–DMS outperforms DMSS . For smaller
SNR values the classification accuracy is relatively small (the
channel noise already makes classification hard), and only the
oracle defense ODMS gives noticeable improvement. As ex-
pected, the performance of DMS gets closer to its lower bound,
ODMS, as the SNR increases (note that the two methods
coincide at the limit of infinite SNR). The similar performance
of DMSS and DMS for medium SNR values shows a similar
transferability of adversarial attacks in our situation as was
observed in other machine learning problems, such as in image
classification [13], although this effect deteriorates quickly as
the SNR increases and DMS becomes more effective. Observe
that the classification accuracy of DMS increases up to 0 dB
SNR, when the noise is the main cause of the performance
limitation of the intruder, while the accuracy decreases for
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Fig. 3: Effect of signal to perturbation ratio SPR on the modu-
lation classification accuracy and the bit error rate (QAM64).
larger SNR when the defense mechanism starts working.
The reduced classification accuracy of the intruder for DMS
and DMSS are countered by the increased BER at the receiver.
To illustrate this effect, Fig. 2 shows the BER for PSK8
and QAM64; other modulation schemes show similar relative
behavior, mostly to PSK8, but with the error dropping sharply
for smaller SNR values, with a few dB difference among the
different modulation schemes (up to about 5 dB for PSK8).
On the other hand, the price of using any defense mechanism
on QAM64 is severe, causing orders of magnitude larger BER
in the high SNR region.
This negative effect can be suppressed if the perturbation
size is decreased, which –at the same time– results in increased
detection accuracy. This is shown in Fig. 3, as a function of the
signal-to-perturbation ratio SPR , n/‖δ‖22 (recall n = 128,
and SPR ≈ 11.5dB corresponds to ǫ = 3). In every case,
DMS trades off increased BER for reduced detection accuracy
compared to the no-defense case.
A more systematic way of improving the BER is to use
our BER-aware modulation schemes BDMS and BODMS. Due
to the large computational overhead of calculating the SPSA
gradient estimates (7) (with K = 400), we only used 400
signal blocks to measure the test performance (instead of the
300× 20 = 6000 blocks used previously).
Fig. 4 shows the modulation classification accuracy and the
bit error rate of BDMS and BODMS, also compared with DMS
and the standard modulation schemes without any defense
mechanism. Since BDMS depends on the weighting coefficient
λ, results for multiple λ values are presented. It can be seen
that for large SNR (≥ 8dB), all defensive schemes achieve
roughly the same classification accuracy (much smaller than
for the no-defense case), while BODMS and BDMS for large λ
provide significant improvement in the bit error rate (shown for
QAM64); note, however, that the errors are still significantly
higher than for the standard QAM64 modulation.
It is interesting to observe that the behavior of DMS
essentially coincides with that of BDMS with λ = 1. Also note
that BODMS can approach the performance of BDMS with the
best λ (10000), without the need to tune the hyperparameter λ.
Although this is promising, further experiments are needed to
validate if this holds more generally. For medium SNR values,
DMS slightly outperforms the other methods.
            
 6 1 5   G % 
   
   
   
   
   
 0
 R G
 X O
 D W
 L R
 Q 
 &
 O D
 V V
 L I L
 F D
 W L R
 Q 
 $ F
 F X
 U D
 F \
 1 R 3 H U W X U E
DMS
BDMS λ     
BDMS λ        
BDMS λ         
BODMS
(a) Modulation classification accuracy
            
 6 1 5   G % 
  
 í 
  
 í 
  
 í 
  
 í 
  
 í 
 % L
 W  (
 U U R
 U  5
 D W
 H 
 1 R 3 H U W X U E
DMS
BDMS λ     
BDMS λ        
BDMS λ         
BODMS
(b) Bit error rate
Fig. 4: Modulation classification accuracy and bit error rate
(QAM64) for BER-aware modulation schemes (ǫ = 3).
V. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a novel way to secure communication over a
wireless channel from a deep-learning-based intruder whose
goal is to detect the modulation scheme. In the proposed
schemes, the modulation method of the transmitter is perturbed
using an adversarial perturbation derived against the modula-
tion classifier of the intruder. Experimental results on synthetic
problems verify the viability of our approach by showing that
our methods are able to substantially reduce the modulation
classification accuracy of the intruder with minimal sacrifice
in the communication performance.
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